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Abstract: The theoretical arguments in favour and against citations to foreign courts have reached 
a high degree of sophistication. Yet, this debate is often based on merely anecdotal assumptions 
about the actual use of cross-citations. This article aims to fill this gap. It provides quantitative 
evidence from ten European supreme courts in order to assess the desirability of such cross-
citations. In addition, it examines individual cases qualitatively, developing a taxonomy of cross-
citations based on the degree to which courts engage with foreign law. Overall, this article high-
lights the often superficial nature of cross-citations in the some courts; yet, it also concludes that, 
by and large, our analysis supports the use of cross-citations: it does not have the pernicious ef-
fects sometimes suggested by critics of the practices, such as undercutting national sovereignty 
and the legitimacy of the legal system. At best, cross-citations provide a source of inspiration 
how to interpret national law. At worst, they are largely ornamental and marginally help to make 
a particular policy argument appear more persuasive. 
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1. Introduction 
In the United States it is highly controversial whether courts are allowed, or even encoured, to 
refer to precedents from foreign courts. This is not a purely academic debate. The US Supreme 
Court itself is divided on whether it is legitimate to rely on foreign law in the interpretation of the 
US Constitution,1 and the occasional reference to foreign sources by some judges has been the 
subject of congressional hearings and debates in the Blogosphere as well as in legal scholarship.2 
Justice Kennedy has actually been called “the most dangerous man in America”, inter alia, be-
cause of his endorsement of citations to foreign cases.3 In addition, the state of Oklahoma at-
tracted considerable attention by explicitly prohibiting state courts from looking “to the legal pre-
cepts of other nations or cultures” specifically mentioning international law and Sharia Law; 
other states have passed or are debating measures with similar intentions.4  
In Europe the discussion about the desirability of cross-citations is less politically conten-
tious. A possible explanation could be that due to EU law (as well as the European Convention 
on Human Rights) it may just be natural for national courts to consider the case law of other 
Member States. But the EU is not (yet) akin to a federal state. A study comparing the EU with 
twenty federal states found that the EU provides significantly less legal uniformity than these 
states.5 Thus, for many topics largely uninfluenced by EU law it may be more irregular if, say, an 
English court cites a Spanish one. In particular, such reluctance may be related to the diversity of 
European countries, for example, in terms of legal traditions, languages and cultures. Thus, Eu-
rope can be seen as an interesting test ground to assess the frequency and desirability of cross-
citations. 
A project by the authors of this article has collected empirical data on cross-citations be-
tween the supreme courts of Austria, Belgium, England and Wales, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland. We found 1,430 instances in which these courts 
have cited the supreme courts of the other nine countries in a period of eight years. Two previous 
articles, deriving from this project, explored in which circumstances these cross-citations take 
place: the first one analyzed how the cross-citations are structured,6 and the second one undertook 
                                                 
1
 The most contentious cases were Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas 123 Ct. 2472 
(2003); Aktins v Virginia 536 US 304 (2002); Foster v. Florida, 537 US 990 (2002); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 
US 815 (1988). See, e.g. Joan Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a Wider Civilization, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 
1283, 1286 (2004); see also the transcript of a debate between Justices Scalia and Breyer on foreign law, available at 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/posts. 
2
 See the references in the next sections.  
3
 This is attributed to Dr. James Dobson, the founder of evangelical organization Focus on the Family, see 
http://www.albertmohler.com/2003/09/22/the-most-dangerous-man-in-america/. 
4
 OK CONST. ART. 7, § 1 (2010); but see Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1132-33 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming an in-
junction against Oklahoma’s constitutional ban). For an overview, see, e.g. Penny M. Venetis, The Unconstitutional-
ity of Oklahoma’s SQ and Other Provisions Like it that Bar State Courts from Considering International Law, 59 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189, 194-198 (2011). 
5
 DANIEL HALBERSTAM, MATHIAS REIMANN AND JORGE SANCHEZ-CORDERO (eds.), FEDERALISM AND LEGAL 
UNIFICATION: A COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF TWENTY SYSTEMS (2012) (finding that on an index 
from 0 to 10: the EU scores 2.7 whereas the average is 4.4 for the federal states). 
6
 Martin Gelter & Mathias Siems, Networks, Dialogue or One-Way Traffic? An Empirical Analysis of Cross-
Citations Between Ten of Europe’s Highest Courts, 8 UTRECHT L. REV. 88 (2012). 
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regression analysis in order to understand the differences between them.7 The present article has a 
different focus: here, our main interest is not in the positive question why cross-citations occur, 
but in the normative one whether it should be possible to cite foreign courts. For this purpose, we 
will use our data on cross-citations in order to confirm or refute some of the assumptions of the 
arguments in favor or against cross-citations.  
This article is structured as follows: To set the scene, Section 2 develops a conceptual 
scheme in order to structure the arguments about the benefits and risks of cross-citations. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 analyze our general data on cross-citations with descriptive and inferential statistics; 
in addition, the subsequent Section 5 distinguishes cross-citations between areas of law. But, 
while the focus of this article in our quantitative dataset, it is also rewarding to examine individ-
ual cases in a qualitative way: thus, based on representative cases, Section 6 develops a taxonomy 
of different types of cross-citations. The final Section 7 returns to our conceptual scheme in order 
to re-assess the normative case for citations to foreign courts. 
2. The debate on the benefits and risks of cross-citations 
The extensive literature on cross-citations offers a wide range of reasons why those should or 
should not occur.8 These arguments can be classified into three categories, namely whether they 
relate to the character of law, the quality of the decision or procedural reasons. Figure 1 provides 
an overview of the patterns of argument with details being explained in the following. 
 
                                                 
7
 Martin Gelter & Mathias Siems, Language, Legal Origins, and Culture before the Courts: Cross-Citations between 
Supreme Courts in Europe, forthcoming in 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. (2013). 
8
 See the following notes, and, e.g., MICHAL BOBEK, COMPARATIVE REASONING IN EUROPEAN SUPREME COURTS 
(2013); Thomas Kadner Graziano, Is It Legitimate and Beneficial for Judges to Use Comparative Law? 21 EUR. REV. 
PRIV. L. 687 (2013); Ton M. Hol, Internationalisation and Legitimacy of Decisions by the Highest Courts, in 
HIGHEST COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW: CHALLENGES AND CHANGES 77 (Sam Muller & Marc 
Loth eds. 2009); Katharine G. Young, The World, through the Judge’s Eye, 28 AUSTRALIAN YEAR BOOK OF INT’L 
LAW 27 (2009); Lord Steyn, The Challenge of Comparative Law, 8 EUR. J. L. REFORM 3 (2007); Rebecca R. Zubaty, 
Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution: Delimiting the Range of Persuasive Authority, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1413 
(2007); Jacob J. Zehnder, Constitutional Comparativism: The Emerging Risk of Comparative Law as a Constitu-
tional Tiebreaker, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1739 (2007); Donald Earl Childress III, Using Comparative Constitutional 
Law to Resolve Domestic Federal Questions, 53 DUKE L. J. 193 (2003). 
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Figure 1: The patterns of argument of foreign court citations 
 A. Character of law B. Quality of decision C. Procedural reasons 
 
1. Pro 
 
common core 
 
 
useful information 
 
 
 
transparency 
 
2. Contra national  
character 
 
“cherry picking” and 
misapplications 
 
costs and  
lack of benefits 
 
3. Reply foreign case law not  
authoritative 
develop criteria for using 
foreign case law 
make foreign case law 
more easily accessible 
 
Starting with the “pro-reasons”, the first one is that cross-citations are justified by a common core 
of legal systems. Such a statement may be limited to the countries of the same legal family,9 but 
one can also go further. For example, in a keynote speech Justice Breyer observed that “cross-
country results (…) resemble each other more and more, exhibiting common, if not universal, 
principles in a variety of legal areas”.10 Such similarities may reflect deep moral universalism,11 
or it could also simply be a matter of fact that many, if not all, modern legal systems have close 
connections and a long history of judicial borrowings.12 
 A variation of this argument is that the common core is something which is more aspira-
tional, but that there are good reasons that legal systems should aim for it. The desire for har-
monization and convergence has been a frequent topic of modern comparative law, and it may 
also be supported by law-and-economics thinking, given the costs of legal diversity.13 Another 
version of this argument is that economic, social and cultural globalization has led to a shift that 
judges cannot ignore lest your legal system becomes “legal backwater”;14 thus, it is frequently 
also suggested that we should aim for “judicial dialogue”, “judicial comity”, or even “a global 
community of courts”.15 
 The second reason suggests that foreign case law can provide useful information to im-
prove the quality of judgments. For example, it may be the case that foreign courts had more op-
portunities to deal with certain difficult legal problems, and therefore, considering their experi-
                                                 
9
 See, e.g., Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 576 (per Lord Atkin) [House of Lords]: “It is always a satisfaction to 
an English lawyer to be able to test his application of fundamental principles of the common law by the development 
of the same doctrines by the lawyers of the Courts of the United States.” 
10
 Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INT’L L. PROCEEDINGS 265, 268 (2003). 
11
 Cf. Lisa Sofio, Recent Developments in the Debate Concerning the Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 30 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 131, 143 (2006). 
12
 Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637, 
668. 
13
 E.g., UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 94, 219 (1997). 
14
 Cf. Daniel J. Frank, Interpretation Revisited: The Effects of a Delicate Supreme Court Balance on the Inclusion of 
Foreign law in American Jurisprudence, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1037, 1069 (2007). 
15
 E.g., Olga Frishman, Transnational Judicial Dialogue as an Organisational Field, EUR. L. J. (forthcoming); 
Frank, id., at 1065; Anne Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191 (2003). 
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ence may be beneficial to fill a temporary gap in the current law.16 Thus, here, it is precisely the 
initial legal diversity that is helpful as it provides a laboratory to find the best solutions. Foreign 
experience can also provide useful empirical data on the effect of the law: for example, knowing 
about the effect of a foreign court decision on a controversial issue can help domestic courts to 
decide on whether or not such an approach is worth following.17 
Third, it can be suggested that cross-citations to foreign cases make transparent what may 
have influenced the judge’s reasoning anyway. Thus, the argument is that, if cross-citations were 
prohibited, judges would still read and consider foreign case law, but just do not admit it openly. 
This point can also be illustrated by the French tradition of judicial drafting: here, judgments are 
written in a very condensed and formal style but it has been shown that, behind the scenes, 
French courts also use considerably more comprehensive arguments.18 
The three “contra-reasons” correspond to these categories. First, a frequent objection is 
based on the national character of legal systems. From an internal perspective the counter-
argument is that, even today, law is not universal,19 with the US literature often saying that US 
law is exceptional or even unique.20 In particular, there could still be deep differences between 
common and civil law countries, though critics may also refer to differences within legal fami-
lies, to quote a famous English judgment: “for though the source of the law in the two countries 
may be the same, its current may well flow in different channels”.21 
A main substantive reason behind this counter-argument is that the influence of foreign 
case law is said to undermine national sovereignty and democracy: a judge has the duty to apply 
the law of his or her country (unless told otherwise),22 and if there are useful legal ideas abroad, it 
is only for the legislator to consider adopting such rules.23 If it were otherwise, it is also sug-
gested that this may threaten the legitimacy and acceptance of courts.24 A further substantive rea-
son is that, taking an external perspective, law is seen as a mirror of a particular culture and soci-
ety.25 Using foreign case law would therefore disrespect that law can only be understood in its 
economic, social, cultural and political context.26 Most obviously this could be the case for ques-
tions that have a moral dimension since morality is typically location-specific.27 
                                                 
16
 Jacob Foster, The Use of Foreign Case Law in Constitutional Interpretation: Lessons From South-Africa, 45 
U.S.F. L. REV. 79 (for post-Apartheid South-Africa). 
17
 Osmar J. Benvenuto, Reevaluating the Debate Surrounding the Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Precedent, 38 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2596, 2726 (2006). 
18
 See MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPA-
RENCY AND LEGITIMACY (2006). 
19
 E.g., Pierre Legrand, On the Singularity of Law, 47 HARV. INT’L L. J.517 (2006). 
20
 Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 NYU L. REV. 1971 (2004). 
21
 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 576 per Lord Buckmaster (dissenting) [House of Lords]. 
22
 Ernesto J. Sanchez, A Case Against Judicial Internationalism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 185 (2005). But see the South 
African Constitution, s. 39(1)(a) (explicitly allowing “to consider foreign law”); Kadner Graziano, supra note 8, at 
698 (for the situation in Swiss law, at least, where there is a “gap”). 
23
 Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 199 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005); Richard A. Posner, No Thanks: 
We Already Have our Own Laws, LEGAL AFFAIRS (2004), available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-
August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp; Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Consti-
tution, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (2004). 
24
 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Use of International Law in Judicial Decisions, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB.POL’Y 423, 425-
26 (2004); Cheryl Saunders, Judicial engagement with comparative law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 571, 583-6 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds. 2011). 
25
 See the discussion in MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 6 (2014, forthcoming). 
26
 Pierre Legrand, Comparative Legal Studies and the Matter of Authenticity, 1 J. COMP. L. 371, 419 (2006). 
27
 Larsen, supra note 1, at 1283. 
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The second counter-argument is that cross-citations harm the quality of judgments. The 
most frequent variant of this argument is that the possibility of referring to foreign cases provides 
judges with too much discretion since it enables “result-driven cherry picking” and “haphazard 
comparativism”.28 In the words of Chief Justice Roberts: “if you don’t find it in the decisions of 
France or Italy, it’s in the decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia, or wherever”.29 Moreover, 
allowing references to foreign courts is said to undermine the consistency of the law.30 Finally, it 
is said to be impossible for a judge to adequately understand foreign law, in particular in its legal 
but also its socio-cultural context:31 thus, since “a little learning can be dangerous”,32 even con-
sidering foreign law with the best intentions may be counter-productive for the quality of judg-
ments. 
Third, the costs of cross-citations also play a role for the procedural counter-arguments. 
Here, the view is that, while adequate research on foreign law may be possible, it is often too 
costly and time-consuming. It can also be suggested that producing a judgment with many refer-
ences to foreign courts is not an effort worth spending anyway since, instead of following an 
“aristocratic mode” of citing authorities,33 it would be more important to be transparent about the 
actual policy-arguments underlying the decision in question.  
The final line of Table 1 summarizes possible replies to these counter-arguments, also 
pointing towards intermediate positions. First, defenders of cross-citations may respond that de-
mocracy and judicial legitimacy are not at risk since foreign case law is not seen as a binding 
authority. This is clear if one takes the realist position that the text of judgments is largely irrele-
vant because, then, cross-citations would be mainly rhetorical.34 But, it may also be said that 
cross-citations have (merely) an “informational value” in order to communicate a good idea about 
the way others have dealt with a particular problem.35 This may be legitimate given that legal 
rules are often not entirely clear and therefore it is normal for judges to solve these ambiguities, 
employing any information that is relevant and useful, be it academic writings, common sense, or 
foreign case law.36 
Second, selective or inappropriate use of foreign case law invites the response that one 
should therefore develop criteria for selecting the appropriate foreign judgments in question. In 
the case law of the US Supreme Court, the reference is often to the majority view of the interna-
tional community,37 which would already exclude the risk of relying on outliers. In the US litera-
ture further criteria have been developed, for example, considering whether the countries, the 
courts and the specific cases in question are sufficiently similar.38 To be sure, these may not lead 
                                                 
28
 Alford, supra note 23. 
29
 Chief Justice Roberts at his confirmation hearings, transcript available at 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/13/se.04.html. 
30
 Sanchez, supra note 22, at 219. 
31
 Cf. Foster, supra note 16. 
32
 Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB.POL'Y 653, 661 (2009). 
33
 John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 329 (2006). 
34
 Cf. Benvenuto, supra note 17, at 2697. 
35
 McGinnis, supra note 33, at 310.  
36
 See also John Bell, The Argumentative Status of Foreign Legal Arguments 8 UTRECHT L. REV. 8, 11 (2012) (“In a 
national legal argument, there may be previous judicial decisions, analogy with legislation, arguments of fairness or 
justice, arguments of legal policy and the like. (…) To my mind, the argument from a foreign legal system typically 
adds lustre to an argument already available in the host legal system”). 
37
 E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (per Justice Kennedy). 
38
 See Benvenuto, supra note 17, at 2731. 
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to absolute certainty, but this is not fundamentally different from purely domestic judicial deci-
sion-making, where it is often equally unclear why a court picked a particular policy reason or 
interpretation method over others. 
Third, the time and effort it takes to learn about foreign case law may only show the need 
to improve communication about foreign case law, for instance, through electronic databases and 
the legal literature. This reply also addresses the counter-argument that citing an obscure foreign 
judgment may be a way to disguise an inconvenient policy argument: if case law is made avail-
able in a sensible way, citing a foreign judgment may not impede an understanding of the court’s 
reasoning more than citing a domestic one. 
This concludes the overview of the debate about the pros and cons of foreign court cita-
tions. The following will use data collected from cross-citations between supreme courts in Eu-
rope in order to evaluate these claims. This procedure may invite the response that one cannot 
infer from “is” to “ought” statements.39 Yet, in the present case, many of the normative argu-
ments on why cross-citations should or should not be allowed are based on assumptions about the 
way cross-citations operate in reality. Thus, challenging those assumptions can contribute to an 
assessment of these normative arguments. In addition, the conclusion of this article will return to 
the patterns of argument of Table 1 in order to show which of these points could be confirmed or 
refuted. 
3. Empirical data on cross-citations in Europe 
3.1. Introduction 
Some previous studies have examined cross-citations between supreme courts, yet, usually not in 
a quantitative and empirical way. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one empirical study 
on how often US courts make use of foreign decisions.40 In Europe the positive debate about the 
prevalence of cross-citations has been more extensive: some say that at least some courts fairly 
frequently refer to the case law of other countries’ supreme courts,41 while other studies claim 
that courts look across the border only rarely.42 But only few studies provide actual data on the 
                                                 
39
 The “is /ought problem” goes back to DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 335 (1739). 
40
 David Zaring, The Use of Foreign Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 297 (2006). 
41
 E.g., Carl Baudenbacher, Judicial Globalization: New Development or Old Wine in New Bottles? 38 TEX. INT’L L. 
J. 505 (2003); LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILL, WIDENING HORIZONS: THE INFLUENCE OF COMPARATIVE LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON DOMESTIC LAW (2010); cautiously also Elaine Mak, Why Do Dutch and UK Judges Cite 
Foreign Law? 70 CAMBRIDGE L J 420 (2011); Elaine Mak, Globalisation of the National Judiciary and the Dutch 
Constitution, 9 UTRECHT L. REV. 36 (2013). 
42
 E.g., Sir Basil Markesinis & Jörg Fedtke, The Judge as Comparatist, 70 TUL. L. REV. 11 (2005); SIR BASIL 
MARKESINIS & JÖRG FEDTKE, JUDICIAL RECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW (2006); Sir Basil Markesinis, Judicial Mental-
ity: Mental Disposition or Outlook as a Factor. Impeding Recourse to Foreign Law, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1325 (2006); 
GUY CANIVET, MADS ANDENAS & DUNCAN FAIRGRIEVE, COMPARATIVE LAW BEFORE THE COURTS (2004); ULRICH 
DROBNIG & SJEF VAN ERP (1999), THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS (1999); specifically for Germany 
Ulrich Drobnig, Rechtsvergleichung in der deutschen Rechtsprechung, 50 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES 
UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 610 (1986); Hein Kötz, Der Bundesgerichtshof und die Rechtsvergleichung, in 
2 FESTGABE 50 JAHRE BUNDESGERICHTSHOF 825 (ANDREAS HELDRICH & KLAUS J. HOPT eds. 2000); for Italy Guido 
Smorto, L’uso giurisprudenziale della comparazione, 2010 EUROPA E DIRITTO PRIVATO 223; for the House of Lords 
M. Nounckele, Aux frontières de la comparaison, 2012 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT COMPARE 393, 
394-403. 
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number of cross-citations and those data are also limited to decisions published in particular re-
ports or journals.43 The project on which this article is based wants to fill this gap as it considers 
almost all decisions of ten European supreme courts over a period of eight years. It is the aim of 
this section to introduce our empirical data. This will make reference to two of our previous arti-
cles which examined different aspects of this dataset.44 However, this section is the first one that 
includes the full matrix of cross-citations. Moreover, in line with the general aim of this article, 
we address the normative question of whether these data may show that cross-citations should or 
should not take place. 
3.2. Population and search method 
The data of this project are based on cross-citations in matters of civil and criminal law between 
the supreme courts of ten European countries – in contrast to many of the previous studies that 
have focussed on constitutional law.45 We aimed to include a good mix of countries: according to 
the frequent distinction into legal origins, we have two English legal origin countries (England46 
and Ireland), three German legal origin countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland), four French 
legal origin countries (France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain) plus the Netherlands, which is some 
studies classified as French and others as German legal origin.47  
Usually, it was straight-forward to identify the main courts of last resort in matters of civil 
and criminal law. For example, as far as a country has both a supreme court and a constitutional 
court, we analysed the supreme court since only some constitutional questions relate to matters of 
civil and criminal law. We applied a similar line of reasoning to the English and Irish courts: for 
example, the English equivalent to the supreme courts of the civil law countries is the Court of 
Appeal of England and Wales, which is responsible for appeals in civil and criminal matters. Al-
though these matters may then be appealed to the UK Supreme Court, this does not make it to the 
main appeal court in matters of civil and criminal law since only very few of such cases reach the 
Supreme Court. This can also be illustrated by the number of judges and decisions of these two 
types of courts: the constitutional courts and the UK Supreme Court have a relatively small num-
ber of judges (typically between 10 and 20) and they tend to deliver less than 100 judgments per 
year, whereas the main supreme courts in matters of civil and criminal law typically have more 
than 40 judges, deciding several hundreds (or even thousands) of cases per year..48 
 
                                                 
43
 Esin Örücü, Comparative Law in Practice: The Courts and the Legislator, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK 
411 (Esin Örücü & David Nelken eds. 2007); Mathias Siems, Citation Patterns of the German Federal Supreme 
Court and of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, 21 KING’S L. J. 152 (2010). See also Gelter & Siems, supra 
note 7. 
44
 See supra notes 6 and 7. 
45
 See, e.g., TANIA GROPPI & MARIE-CLAIRE PONTHOREAU (eds.), THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES (2013); Cheryl Saunders, Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Is There a Prob-
lem?, 59 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 91 (2006); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional 
Law, 108 YALE L. J. 1225 (1999). 
46
 In the following the term “England” is always to be read as referring to “England and Wales”. 
47
 See infra 4.3. 
48
 For details see Gelter & Siems, supra note 7, section II.A.2. 
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Table 1: Countries and courts of our research 
Country  Population 
200449 
Name of su-
preme court 
Database used Subject matter juris-
diction of court  
Total num-
ber of 
reported 
decisions 
2000-2007  
Decisions 
per 1,000 
inhabitants 
Austria 8,174,762 Oberster Ge-
richtshof 
RIS50 Civil law (including 
employment and 
social law), criminal 
law 
28,868 3.53 
 
Belgium 10,348,276 Cour de cassa-
tion, Hof van 
Cassatie 
Court web-
site51 
Civil law (including 
employment, law), 
criminal law 
24,053 2.42 
 
England 
and Wales 
53,057,000 Court of Ap-
peal 
Westlaw52 All areas of law 25,855 0.49 
 
France 60,424,213 Cour de cassa-
tion 
Legifrance53 
and court 
website54 
Civil law (including 
employment, law), 
criminal law 
107,396 1.78 
 
Germany 82,424,609 Bundes-
gerichtshof 
Beck Online55 Civil Law (excluding 
employment and 
social security law), 
and Criminal Law 
22,950 0.28 
 
Ireland 3,969,558 High Court Bailii56 and 
Court web-
site57 
 
All areas of law (but 
not criminal appeals) 
2,357  0.59 
 
Italy 58,057,477 Corte di cas-
sazione, Corte 
Suprema di 
Cassazione 
 
De Jure58 All areas of law (with 
the exception of con-
stitutional matters) 
196,876 3.39 
 
Nether-
lands 
16,318,199 Hoge Raad Court web-
site59 
Civil (including em-
ployment law), crim-
9,073 
[36,020]60 
0.56 
[2,20] 
                                                 
49
 Sources: CIA Factbook, 2004 data available at http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/peo_pop_cia_fac-people-
population-cia-factbook&date=2004. For England and Wales: National Statistics website, available at 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=Population.  
50
 http://www.ris.bka.gv.at (public law database of the Federal Chancellery). 
51
 http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/?lang=fr. Source for the number of decisions: Rapport Annuel 2007, available at 
http://justice.belgium.be/fr/ordre_judiciaire/cours_et_tribunaux/cour_de_cassation/documents/rapports_annuels/, at 
pp. 220-221. 
52
 http://www.westlaw.co.uk (Law Reports and Official Transcripts). 
53
 http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.  
54
 http://www.courdecassation.fr/ (for selected opinions of the advocate general). 
55
 http://www.beck-online.de. 
56
 http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/. 
57
 http://www.courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/advancedsearch?openform&l=en.  
58
 http://dejure.giuffre.it/ (commercial database used with University of Bologna subscription).  
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inal and tax law  
Spain 40,280,780 Tribunal 
Supremo 
Court web-
site61 
All areas of law (with 
the exception of con-
stitutional matters) 
190,174 4.72 
 
Switzer-
land 
7,450,867 Bundesgericht Court web-
site62 
All areas of law 27,570  3.70 
 
 
Table 1 presents the list of countries and courts examined, the databases used, and the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the ten supreme courts. It also indicates how many decisions these courts 
have reported between 2000 and 2007 and how this translates into decisions per capita. It is not 
the aim of this article to explore why countries differ in the absolute number of cases and the de-
cisions per capita. Rather, here, we are interested in the cross-citations between these ten courts, 
using the full text of (almost) all decisions of these courts for the period between 2000 and 
2007.63 
In order to locate citations to foreign courts covered by our study, we compiled an exten-
sive list of search terms.64 In all countries, we first looked at the actual decisions. For France, the 
Netherlands and Belgium we also included the opinions of the advocate generals where available. 
In France, we also looked at the available opinions of the reporting judge (conseiller rapporteur). 
Inclusion of these documents was necessary because in some countries the legal justification of a 
decision that in other systems would be found in the decisions themselves will appear only in the 
opinions of the reporting judge or advocate general. For example, French decisions tend to be 
very short and written in a formulaic style. The legal justification of a decision, including cita-
tions, which in other systems would be found in the decisions themselves, will therefore often 
appear only in the opinions of the reporting judge or advocate general.65 
We checked all citations by hand. In doing so, we also coded two further pieces of infor-
mation: we classified cases according to the reasons why foreign courts were cited, and we iden-
tified for each case the main area of law. Both will be discussed in the following.  
3.3. Presentation of the main data on cross-citations 
Based on the search method explained in the previous section, Table 2 contains the main results 
of our initial analysis. It can be seen that there are many relations with no or few single-digit 
cross-citations, but also two, Austria to Germany and Ireland to England, with more than 400 
citations. This can be seen as an initial indication that courts do not randomly “cherry-pick” deci-
sions from courts that suit their result, but that they turn to the case law of relatively similar legal 
systems. 
                                                                                                                                                              
59
 http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/default.aspx?searchtype=kenmerken&instantie_uz=Hoge%20Ra ad. 
60
 Number of decisions according to the annual reports; see Jaarverslagen, available at 
http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie/Publicaties-En-Brochures/Pages/Jaardocumenten.aspx. 
61
 http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/. 
62
 http://www.bger.ch/index/juridiction/jurisdiction-inherit-template/jurisdiction-recht/jurisdiction-recht-
urteile2000.htm and http://www.polyreg.ch/d/informationen/bge.html. 
63
 Exception: the Netherlands, see Table 1.  
64
 Usually, this was straightforward. However, for the citations of the High Court of Ireland to the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales we had to rely on a random sample of decisions because citations to English courts do not always 
reveal whether the cited court is really the Court of Appeal (for details see Gelter & Siems, supra note 7, section 
II.B). 
65
 See, e.g., JOHN BELL, JUDICIARIES WITHIN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 75 (2006). 
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Table 2: Number of cross-citations per citing court66 
 
Cited courts 
 
Aus
tria 
Bel-
gium 
Eng-
land 
France Ger-
many 
Ire-
land 
Italy Nether-
lands 
Spai
n 
Swit-
zerland 
Total 
cita-
tions 
Austria 0 0 1 4 467 0 4 0 0 26 502 
Belgium 0 0 0 42 7 0 1 11 0 2 63 
England 2 4 0 23 11 10 1 13 4 1 69 
France 0 2 0 0 6 0 3 0 0 7 18 
Germany 34 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 6 46 
Ireland 0 1 456 5 1 0 1 3 0 0 467 
Italy 0 2 1 11 4 0 0 0 2 1 21 
Nether-
lands 2 34 16 14 58 0 1 0 0 9 134 
Spain 0 1 0 1 14 0 0 0 0 1 17 
Switzerland 4 2 6 15 61 0 4 1 0 0 93 
Total cited 42 46 481 117 629 10 16 29 7 53 1430 
 
Examining the reasons why foreign courts have been cited, we distinguished between three cate-
gories.67 First, the category “case history and jurisdiction“ refers to the situations where  a prior 
decision by a foreign court is part of the fact pattern that led to the case pending by the citing 
court,68 or where a court has to cite a foreign court if the latter had previously decided about ju-
risdictional issues in the same case. The second category is about cross-citations due to “interna-
tional or European law”, be it EU law or the European Convention on Human Rights. The third 
one concerns cross-citations due to “purely comparative reasons”, i.e., comparisons not trigged 
by matters of international or European law. 
 
                                                 
66
 The full dataset is available at http://cross-citations.blogspot.com/.  
67
 For a similar classification see J.M. Smits, Comparative Law and Its Influence on National Legal Systems, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 513 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds. 2006). See also 
BOBEK, supra note 8, at 21-34 (distinguishing between mandatory, advisable and voluntary use). 
68
 For example, in a custody dispute a foreign court may already have issued a decision; or the court could simply 
mention that one of the parties had been ordered by a foreign court to take a particular action before the currently 
pending case arose. 
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Table 3: Number of types of cross-citations per citing court 
 
case history or 
jurisdiction 
international or 
European law 
pure compara-
tive 
Total citations 
 
Austria 14 57 431 502 
Belgium 4 14 45 63 
England 9 51 9 69 
France 11 2 5 18 
Germany 5 16 25 46 
Ireland 1 84 382 467 
Italy 5 11 5 21 
Netherlands 14 47 73 134 
Spain 1 12 4 17 
Switzerland 29 5 59 93 
Total cited 93 299 1038 1430 
 
Table 3 presents the results. It can be seen that the pure comparative category is the most frequent 
one. Yet, there are also a good number of cross-citations triggered by international or European 
law. In the normative debate, it is sometimes said that national sovereignty and the distinctness of 
national legal cultures are core arguments against cross-citations.69 To this we can respond, that 
in Europe national legal systems are not entirely separate any more, and therefore some cross-
citations are in any case to be expected. 
Courts usually cannot avoid citations related to the case history and jurisdictional issues. 
But this type of citation is not exactly what we were looking for because such citations have no 
bearing on a possible influence of foreign legal arguments. Therefore, unless indicated otherwise, 
the quantitative parts of this article are based on the aggregates of the citations for the categories 
“international or European law” and “pure comparative law”.70 
In addition, we faced the problem that the subject matter jurisdiction of the ten courts is 
not identical. As Table 1 shows, the English, Irish, Swiss, Spanish, and Italian courts can decide 
about almost all areas of law, the Austrian, Belgium, French and Dutch ones, however, do not 
decide on administrative matters, whereas the jurisdiction of the German court is limited to mat-
ters of civil and criminal law. It was therefore crucial that we also identified the precise area of 
law of each decision that cites one of the other courts. Thus, we could limit our analysis to cross-
citations in those areas of law for which all of the ten courts were competent, i.e. civil and crimi-
nal law and the corresponding procedural rules. Table 4 presents these results. In comparison to 
Table 2, it can be seen that, for example, the Ireland-to-England citations have been halved. 
 
                                                 
69
 See supra 2. 
70
 In the qualitative taxonomy, infra 6., we differentiate between further types of cross-citations. 
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Table 4: Number of cross-citations per citing court for common areas of law 
 
Cited courts 
 
Aus-
tria 
Bel-
gium 
Eng-
land 
France Ger-
many 
Ire-
land 
It-
aly 
Nether-
lands 
Spain Switzer-
land 
Total 
cita-
tions 
Austria 0 0 1 4 447 0 3 0 0 21 476 
Belgium 0 0 0 37 6 0 0 6 0 1 50 
England 2 1 0 9 10 7 0 6 2 0 37 
France 0 2 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 7 
Germany 34 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 2 41 
Ireland 0 1 228 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 233 
Italy 0 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Netherlands 2 13 5 9 54 0 1 0 0 6 90 
Spain 0 1 0 1 14 0 0 0 0 0 16 
Switzerland 3 0 2 11 42 0 0 1 0 0 59 
Total cited 41 20 237 77 579 7 6 16 2 31 1016 
 
Even controlling for common areas of law, Table 4 shows that the total number of cross-citations 
per citing court is very diverse. Many reasons could account for those differences. It could be the 
case that some courts and judges are more open to foreign influences. Yet, it would be misleading 
to deduce from Table 4 that the courts with few cross-citations are just too parochial, because in 
some countries judges do not mention every argument that has influenced their decision-making. 
Notably this is the case in the French legal tradition. From a normative perspective this non-
openness may be criticized: indeed it may be used to argue in favor of open cross-citations.71 
More generally, citation style and legal reasoning differ widely between countries. This is 
also relevant for a normative evaluation of cross-citations since it may not be clear whether all 
cross-citations are embedded in a well-reasoned assessment of the foreign court’s reasoning. This 
points towards the need for a qualitative examination of cross-citations, which we also present in 
this article.72 In addition, a good way to control for such differences between citing courts is to 
present the data according to the citations per all cross-citations of each particular court. Thus, 
Table 5 shows most clearly which of the cited courts each of the citing courts prefers to cite.73 
 
Table 5: Percentage distribution of cross-citations per citing court for common areas of law 
 
Cited courts 
 
Aus-
tria 
Bel-
gium 
Eng-
land 
Franc
e 
Ger-
many 
Ire-
land 
Italy Nether-
lands 
Spai
n 
Switzer-
land 
Total 
cita-
tions 
Austria 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.84 93.91 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.00 4.41 100 
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.00 74.00 12.00 0.00 0.00 12.00 0.00 2.00 100 
England 5.41 2.70 0.00 24.32 27.03 18.92 0.00 16.22 5.41 0.00 100 
France 
0.00 
28.5
7 0.00 0.00 42.86 0.00 14.29 0.00 0.00 14.29 100 
Germany 82.93 0.00 2.44 4.88 0.00 0.00 2.44 2.44 0.00 4.88 100 
Ireland 0.00 0.43 97.85 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.00 100 
                                                 
71
 See supra 2. 
72
 See infra 6. 
73
 See also Gelter & Siems, supra note 6, for corresponding bar-charts and network pictures. 
15 
 
Italy 
0.00 
28.5
7 0.00 28.57 42.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100 
Nether-
lands 2.22 
14.4
4 5.56 10.00 60.00 0.00 1.11 0.00 0.00 6.67 100 
Spain 0.00 6.25 0.00 6.25 87.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100 
Switzer-
land 5.08 0.00 3.39 18.64 71.19 0.00 0.00 1.69 0.00 0.00 100 
Mean 
cited 10.63 9.00 12.16 18.71 48.59 2.10 2.05 3.69 0.60 3.58  
 
Table 5 highlights in which instances a court has a favorite counter-part accounting for more than 
half of its cross-citations to the other nine courts. In four instances (Austria, Spain, Switzerland 
and the Netherlands) this most popular cited court is Germany, the most popular German court is 
the Austrian one,74 the most popular Irish the English one, and the most popular Belgium the 
French one. By contrast, the citations of the English and French courts are more evenly split. 
Overall, the picture that emerges is that certain courts seem to be the most popular cited courts, 
but also that citations are not necessarily reciprocated by those cited court. Both of these observa-
tions may also be relevant for the normative debate about cross-citations. They may point to-
wards high quality of decisions of the most cited courts. They also show that receiving many 
cross-citations does not require a strategic approach in also citing the courts of the other coun-
tries.75 
4. Exposing citation networks with quantitative methods 
4.1. Introduction 
The data presented in the previous section invites further analysis about the potential closeness of 
particular groups of countries, and how such similarities and differences relate to cultural, politi-
cal and other factors. Such an analysis could start with certain theories why particular countries 
would be close to each other, for example, referring to legal traditions or language groups, and 
then test these theories by way of regression analysis. But it is also valuable to start without such 
a priori categories in order to find out whether particular countries seem to belong together. Sev-
eral of such “structural equivalence measures” exist, but the most popular one is cluster analysis. 
Both cluster and regression analysis will be presented in the following. 
4.2. Cluster analysis 
As cluster analysis is barely used in legal research,76 it is useful to start with a definition: 
                                                 
74
 Interestingly, the German court does not cite the Swiss court often in our study. It is sometimes suggested that 
Swiss civil law sources are more interesting for German courts than Austrian ones at least in the area of civil law, 
given that the Swiss codification is more modern. E.g. Georg E. Kodek, Rechtsvergleichung als Auslegungsmethode 
im Privatrecht – akademischer Aufputz oder Bereicherung? in RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG ALS JURISTISCHE AUSLE-
GUNGSMETHODE (Anna Gamper & Bea Verschraegen eds., forthcoming), section III. This observation is not sup-
ported by our data. 
75
 See supra 2. (for the “legal backwater” argument). 
76
 For rare examples see Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383 (2009); Frank 
B. Cross, Thomas A. Smith, & Anton Tomarchio, The Reagan Revolution in the Network of Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 
1227 (2007-2008); Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309 (2007). 
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“Cluster analyses are multivariate procedures that divide a data-set into a number 
of subgroups (clusters). In general, they refer to measures of similarity or dissimi-
larity between observations with respect to a set of variables. These are then 
grouped into clusters of low within-cluster variance and high variance between 
clusters. In particular, this can be achieved by successively increasing the tolerated 
level of within-cluster dissimilarity. Starting with the lowest level of aggregation, 
where only identical observations are clustered together, observations and clusters 
are merged until the sample is allocated into two groups that constitute the top of 
the hierarchy”.77 
With the help of a network analysis program,78 the data presented in Table 5 have been clustered 
using two methods. Figure 2 presents “hierarchical clusters”, “optimization clusters” follow in 
the subsequent Table 6.79 These two approaches should not be thought of as opposing each other, 
as the broadly similar results illustrate. 
 
Figure 2: Hierarchical clustering of cross-citations 
 
 
The dendogram of Figure 2 is “a graphic representation of the hierarchy of clusters”.80 Moving 
from the left to the right, the clusters gain in members as the requirement to be part of a cluster 
                                                 
77
 Michael Graff, Law and Finance: Common Law and Civil Law Countries Compared: an Empirical Critique, 75 
ECONOMICA 60, 72 (2008). 
78
 UCINET, available at https://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/home. 
79
 For the precise technical definitions of hierarchical and optimization clusters see 
http://www.analytictech.com/ucinet/help/2cvtid.htm and http://www.analytictech.com/ucinet/help/3j.x0e.htm. 
80
 Graff, supra note 77, at 74. 
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becomes less strict. To start with, there is just a cluster of Austria and Germany, then a cluster of 
England and Ireland, and then a cluster of Belgium and France. For comparative lawyers these 
groups of countries make immediate sense as they are part of the same legal families,81 while 
they may also confirm similarities in terms of geography and language. Then, more surprisingly, 
Spain joins the cluster of Austria and Germany, and Italy joins the one of Belgium and France. 
Subsequently, Switzerland and the Netherlands join the former cluster, and then these two clus-
ters merge, with the result that all continental European countries are part of one cluster, whereas 
England and Ireland form another one. 
 This final division may point towards exceptionality of England and Ireland, but, in this 
respect, the optimization clusters of Table 6, below, do not fully confirm such a result. Optimiza-
tion clusters require that the researcher specifies in advance how many clusters shall be created. 
In addition, Table 6 indicates how well the respective clusters explain the entire dataset (R2) and 
how dense these clusters are. 
 
Table 6: Optimization clustering of cross-citation 
Number of 
clusters 
R2 Countries 
(density of clusters in brackets) 
5 0.551 Italy 
(97.85
0) 
Belgium, France 
(74.568) 
England, Ireland 
(78.118) 
Netherlands, 
Switzerland 
(51.015) 
Austria, Germany, 
Spain (61.988) 
4 0.484 Italy, Belgium, France 
(51.950) 
England, Ireland 
(78.118) 
Netherlands, 
Switzerland 
(51.015) 
Austria, Germany, 
Spain (61.988) 
3 0.369 Italy, Belgium, France 
(51.950) 
England, Ireland, Nether-
lands (48.107) 
Austria, Germany, Spain, 
Switzerland (46.331) 
2 0.189 Italy, Belgium, France, England, Ire-
land (32.333) 
Austria, Germany, Spain, Netherlands, Switzer-
land (36.487) 
 
The options with five and four clusters in Table 6 confirm the results of the hierarchical clusters 
in Figure 1. However, in the variant with three clusters the Netherlands joins England and Ireland 
but then separates from them in the final variant, with England and Ireland joining the Italy-Bel-
gium-France cluster. Re-visiting Table 5, the position of the Netherlands in the third variant 
seems to go against the frequent citations from the Netherlands to Germany, but it reflects that 
the Netherlands has been most frequently cited by England. With respect to the final variant, the 
data make clear that what hold England-Ireland and Italy-Belgium-France together are the rela-
tively frequent citations from England to France.  
As a result, the cluster analysis shows that cross-citations are not somehow random but 
clustered within smaller or larger groups of countries. This speaks against the argument that 
courts would just “cherry-pick” any foreign decision that suits their result;82 rather, it seems that 
within groups of countries cross-citations are relatively common and accepted. However, com-
paring the two types of cluster analysis, it has also been found that as connections become looser 
regularities become less clear. Applying regression analysis may provide a less ambiguous result. 
                                                 
81
 See, e.g., Daphne Barak-Erez, The Institutional Aspects of Comparative Law, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 477, 487 
(2009) (“Courts find it easier to learn from precedents which have been formulated within their so-called ‘legal fam-
ily’ (…) or their legal culture understood in the broad sense.”) 
82
 See supra 2. 
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4.3. Regression analysis 
Regression analysis is a widely used method in empirical legal scholarship. On the most basic 
level, regression analysis seeks to establish a correlation between two (or more) factors within a 
statistically appreciable margin of certainty. 
For a companion article, we performed a number of regression models in order to deter-
mine which factors correlate most strongly with a high propensity of the supreme court in the 
countries in our sample to cite the supreme court of another of these countries.83 Under what cir-
cumstances would we realistically expect cross-citations, i.e. judicial openness to foreign influ-
ence could be driven by a number of indicators? The observations in our analysis are all possible 
combinations of pairs of a citing and cited country (in both directions). We thus identified ex-
planatory variables that defined the relationship between the two countries. These factors broadly 
fall into four categories: characteristics of the cited country, language, legal origin, and geo-
graphic and cultural proximity. 
 First, population is one the main characteristic relevant for the cited country. Larger coun-
tries often influence smaller countries in a variety of ways, particularly when they are culturally 
relatively similar. The legal systems of a pair consisting of a larger and a smaller country often 
stand in an asymmetric relationship, with lawyers, judges, and legal scholars in the smaller coun-
try following legal developments in the larger one quite closely, while jurists from the larger 
country will generally ignore those in the smaller one. Moreover, since larger countries normally 
produce a larger number of cases, new legal problems often need to be addressed there first. 
Besides population size, we included the natural logarithm of the GNP per capita. Richer 
countries might be cited more often because they are perceived as more successful, to which their 
legal system may have contributed. Moreover, we included an index of corruption as a control 
variable.84 A corruption-free legal system might be perceived as providing better and possibly 
less biased legal innovations. 
Second, legal ideas from abroad are much more accessible if they are expressed in lan-
guage the reader can easily understand.85 In our study, we approached the issue from two direc-
tions. First, we created a variable that looks at whether the citing and cited countries share the 
same major national language (defined as being spoken by 20% of the population or more). Sec-
ond, we used Eurobarometer data what percentage of the population of the citing country speaks 
the language of the cited country.86 
Third, in traditional comparative law scholarship, European legal systems are typically di-
vided into “common law” and “civil law” jurisdictions, which is said to be derived from Roman 
law on the other. Frequently, a distinction between French, German, and Scandinavian civil law 
is made.87 This distinction has been picked up by economists during the past 20 years and has 
thus sparked a voluminous literature on the possible economic consequences of countries’ differ-
                                                 
83
 Gelter & Siems, supra note 7. 
84
 The data come from Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Courts, 118 
Q. J. ECON. 453 (2003) [data available at http://faculty.tuck.dartmouth.edu/images/uploads/faculty/rafael-
laporta/Courts-LuxMundi.xls]. 
85
 See Mathias M. Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law, 52 MCGILL L.J. 55, 72-
73 (2007) (discussing language as an explanatory factor for the cross-fertilization of legal ideas). 
86
 EUROBAROMETER, EUROPEANS AND THEIR LANGUAGES 152-154 (2006), at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_243_en.pdf. For Switzerland we used the data collected by the 
Institut für Sprachwissenschaft at the University of Bern, see 
http://www.isw.unibe.ch/content/forschung/archiv_projekte/sprachkompetenzen/index_ger.html. 
87
 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (3rd ed. 1998). 
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ent “legal origins.”88 While the mechanism for the persistence of these apparent effects is some-
what mysterious,89 it is possible that shared legal origins are connected to common educational 
structures and the frequent migration of students from “recipient” countries to origin countries.90 
In Europe, this factor may be less significant than within a post-colonial relationship between 
two-countries. Arguably, a shared legal origin might induce cross-citations, which might be a 
factor driving the results reported in the legal origins literature. 
However, some country classifications are controversial. In our sample, the Netherlands is 
most problematic; it is classified as belonging to the French group in the “legal origins” literature, 
while some comparative lawyers argue that Dutch law has gradually moved away from France 
and closer to German law.91 We therefore also use a separate “legal families” variable that classi-
fies the Netherlands as part of the German group. 
The fourth group of variables relates to non-legal factors that may bring countries closer 
to each other. Courts from countries that are more similar to each other in terms of culture, its 
economic policies, and geography may be more likely to cite each other. Two separate sets of 
variables are commonly used to measure culture, namely indexes developed by Hofstede92 and 
Schwartz.93 Both indexes are based on qualitative survey among similar situated individuals in 
different countries. On the basis of each index, we created an index in an attempt to measure the 
cumulative cultural difference between the citing and cited countries. 
Furthermore, we tried to measure whether there is an impact of the respective “variety of 
capitalism” dominating each country. Deferring to the “varieties of capitalism” literature in eco-
nomic sociology, which suggests that the coordination of economic activities varies across coun-
tries along a number of dimensions, we hypothesized that a legal argument might be more per-
suasive if taken from a country following a similar approach toward economic organization. 
Thus, we created a variable based on a study94 assigning countries a score between 0 to 1 depend-
ing on whether they prefer “strategic coordination” or “market coordination.” 
Finally, we used data from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Interna-
tionales (CEPII)95 to create an index of the geographical distance between each of the countries in 
our sample, assuming that legal arguments might travel more quickly to closer locations. We 
used a weighted measure that looks at the distance between the main economic hubs of the two 
countries weighted by its share of the country’s total population. 
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Obviously, there are other factors that may be relevant but not captured by these variables, 
such as citation and legal writing styles96 or staffing of the court, and the social composition and 
educational background of the judiciary.97 We use country-level dummies for both citing and 
cited courts to capture these factors. 
 
Table 7: Negative Binomial Regression 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (1) (2)   
(constant) -8.754*** -8.077*** 
Population of cited coun-
try 
.0374*** .0389*** 
Corruption score of cited 
country 
.924*** .753*** 
Dependent 
variable: 
number of cross-citations (standard 
errors clustered by citing court) 
GNP of cited country   
Same language  1.122* 
*** significant at the 1% level 
Language skills 3.073*** 2.106*** 
Same legal origin .629**  
** significant at the 5% level 
Same legal family  .599*** 
Cultural difference -1.323*** -.956** 
* significant at the 10% level 
Coordination difference -1.692** -1.475* 
Geographic distance   
Dummies citing court #*** #*** 
Dummies cited court   
Log Pseudolikelihood -142.820 -138.374 
N 90 90 
# significance denotes highest degree 
(individual parameter estimates not 
displayed) 
 
We used a “negative binomial regression model” looking at the absolute numbers of citations of 
one country to another one as dependent variables; consequently we have 90 observations that 
corresponded to the 90 possible relationships between cited and citing country.98 Table 7, above, 
reports the regression results for the best two of our models.99 As can be seen, these two regres-
sions both omit GNP and geographic distance, which turned out not to be statistically significant 
in the regressions not reported here. Similarly, we eliminated the cultural variable based on the 
Hofstede survey, which turned out not to correlate with cross-citations in any regression model, 
contrary to the more recent survey by Schwartz.  
In all of our regressions, cross-citations correlate positively with the population of the cit-
ed country, a low level of corruption, language skills. A greater distance in the “coordination in-
dex” inspired by the varieties of capitalism literature is associated with a smaller number. The 
legal origins variable is only significant when “same language” is not included in the model. Our 
other regressions also indicate that shared legal families and cultural difference overlap to some 
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extent, given that the coefficient for each of them is reduced if the other variable is included.100 
Intuitively, the reason is likely the substantial overlap between culture and legal tradition. 
In order to ensure that these results are “robust”, we performed a number of additional, 
modified regressions. Our results hold even when we eliminate the outliers, i.e. the large number 
of citations of England by the Irish court and of Germany by the Austrian court. Similarly, almost 
all of our results hold when all zeros are dropped from the regression.101 Thus, overall, the regres-
sion results show that there is a good deal of regularity in the way courts cite judgments from 
other countries. As already found in the preceding cluster analysis, this challenges the view that 
cross-citations are just subjective “cherry picking”. 
We can also classify the reasons why a particular court’s decisions are cited across bor-
ders more often than others into three groups:  
(1) Accessibility: Citations will only be made if the decisions are available and compre-
hensible to an international audience. This is shown primarily by the language vari-
ables. If we had variables measuring the degree to which decisions of a particular 
court are available internationally (in print or online), we might discover a related ef-
fect. Geography could conceivably matter for accessibility, but our regression did not 
confirm this. 
(2) Authoritativeness: Some courts seem to be cited because their views carry a greater 
degree of (persuasive) authority than others. The absence of corruption may indicate 
that a court’s views are more likely than not the result of unbiased judicial delibera-
tion, as it reflects a well-functioning judicial and administrative system. The two 
countries that do least well on the corruption index (Italy and Spain) are rarely (if ev-
er) cited.  
A large population in its jurisdiction may support a supreme court’s authority for two 
reasons. First, sheer numbers make the jurisdiction inherently more important. Sec-
ond, in a larger jurisdiction, important and new legal questions are more likely to 
reach the highest court earlier than elsewhere, simply because the probability of a par-
ticular fact pattern arising is higher ceteris paribus. As we have seen above,102 a larger 
population (or GDP) does not necessarily correspond to an equivalent number of su-
preme court cases. However, new and innovative legal questions will rarely be cab-
ined with the lower courts and will reach the country’s highest court nonetheless. 
(3) Similarity: One court’s views may seem more persuasive to another country’s highest 
court because of similarities between the two countries and their legal systems. If two 
countries are close to each other in legal and cultural traditions, and if they occupy 
similar positions on the “varieties of capitalism” scale, the responses to legal and pol-
icy issues addressed by a court in one country may provide a better fit in the other be-
cause the effects will be similar. 
In the companion article we present calculations showing which of these variables are the main 
ones that determine cross-citations. The main finding is that the first and second explanations 
carry more weight; in particular the variables on population of the cited country and a low level 
of corruption, native languages and language skills dominate our results. These variables outper-
form the two measures for different legal traditions, as well as culture and political economy.103 
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For the normative debate a number of lessons can be drawn. With respect to the first 
group of explanations, the relevance of languages is a factor that supports the use of cross-
citations as it shows that judges want to be able to properly understand the decision of a foreign 
court. The second group also speaks in favor of cross-citations. The relevance of a low level of 
corruption and the potential model of larger jurisdictions lead us to suspect that the quality of a 
legal system tends to make it attractive for cross-citations. This may mitigate some of the con-
cerns of critics since, for example, courts are not likely to cite countries with a less reputable le-
gal system only to justify a particular result.104  
Finally, the statistical significance of the third set of explanations shows that courts are in-
terested in the legal, economic and cultural “fit” of the foreign case law. However, we have also 
seen that these explanations play a more limited role than the other factors. This may cause con-
cern as it may indicate a potential mismatch between the foreign law and the society in question. 
Legal origins also occupy a relatively subordinated spot compared to the other factors. If one 
takes the view that similarities between legal systems provide the best justification for citations of 
foreign law, one might be more inclined to side with skeptics as a result. However, the difference 
may not matter that much because both similarities in the law and in culture are also positively 
correlated with language, which is the one pragmatic criterion that turned out to be one of the 
most important factors.  
Moreover, a possible explanation is that broad categories such as civil and common law are 
unsatisfactory since today legal similarities are often related to specific fields of law.105 The fol-
lowing will therefore explore possible variations in further detail: in Section 5 as those relate to 
different areas of law, and in Section 6 for different types of cross-citations. 
5. Citations by field of law 
5.1. Division into fields of law 
In our study, we also collected data on the fields of law in which cross-citations occur. One might 
expect more citations in a field where two countries’ laws are relatively similar, for example, 
because it is strongly permeated by EU directives, or because one country copied the other coun-
try’s law at some time. As in the previous sections, in general, we leave out citations relating to 
the case history and jurisdictional issues and continue to investigate cross-citations relating both 
to issues where the basis for the cross-citation is internationally or European harmonized law, and 
those that are met for purely comparative reasons without a specific international aspect to either 
the case or the underlying law. 
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Table 8: Classification of cases by field of law 
Field Subfields 
Constitutional law constitutional law (general), human rights (also in the context of criminal pro-
cedure), public international law 
Administrative law administrative law (general), data protection (privacy), food and drug law, 
immigration, social insurance, tax law, traffic law, public liability, public ten-
der offers 
Civil law matters typically addressed in civil codes, such as contracts, torts, family law 
and inheritance; consumer protection, landlord-tenant law. 
Criminal law substantive criminal law including sentencing 
Procedural law civil procedure including enforcement and foreclosure (excluding insolvency); 
conflict of laws (both private international law and issues of jurisdiction); arbi-
tration; criminal procedure 
Commercial law core commercial law (typically included in commercial codes); corporate and 
partnership law; antitrust and unfair competition; banking, insurance and securi-
ties law (excluding regulatory aspects), insolvency law, international trade; 
intellectual property, employment law. 
 
Initially we classified our citations in 31 categories. Given the limited number of cases in most 
fields, we regrouped them into six broader ones, as shown in Table 8. The categorization follows 
common practice in how the fields are divided up in much of Europe. Private law is split in 
“core” civil law and commercial law. In the public law area, we distinguish constitutional law 
and administrative law (which includes, e.g., public liability). Criminal and procedural law are 
kept separate. Obviously, the classification has a subjective element, but it also reflects European 
traditions how different areas are split up in legal codes, treatises, and teaching. The relatively 
broad civil law and commercial law fields may seem unusual to American readers. However, 
classic civil codes typically comprise the interwoven fields of contracts, torts, and property, as 
well as family and inheritance law. Consumer protection and landlord-tenant law, even though 
they are sometimes “outsourced” into separate statutes, are considered essentially subfields of 
contract law. The commercial law category includes all business law and intellectual property 
(IP) areas, which are traditionally thought of as commercial law areas. From a European perspec-
tive, the decision most strongly in need of justification was the lumping of civil and criminal pro-
cedure, which are sometimes categorized with the respective substantive areas. But here we de-
cided to follow the more Anglo-American view that procedural rules are bound to share many 
common features. 
One of the difficult issues in the data collection process was how to assign any specific 
case to a particular area. In real life, many, if not most cases touch upon various fields. Since our 
research question was to identify citations – and not cases – by field, we read the respective deci-
sion to determine the context of the particular citation and assigned the field based on what legal 
issue was discussed. When the citation concerned several issues, we tried to determine which of 
them dominated. In those rare cases where there were several citations to the same foreign court, 
we also had to make a judgment call which one was more important. When an opinion cited sev-
eral foreign courts, we counted each of them as a separate citation. 
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Table 9: Classification of cases by field of law 
Field Constitu-
tional law 
Administra-
tive law 
Core civil 
law 
Criminal 
law 
Procedural 
law 
Commer-
cial law 
All citations 89 201 311 55 244 437 
Core areas 0 12 311 55 244 394 
 
As explained in section 3.3, we ultimately eliminated cross-citations outside a certain “common 
core” of areas of law from our dataset to avoid a skew in favor if certain jurisdictions (these are 
the ones in italics in Table 8). Our analysis thus only covers those fields over which all ten courts 
retain jurisdiction. As shown in Table 9, this eliminates all constitutional law and eviscerates ad-
ministrative law citations, most of which were between Ireland and England. The number of cita-
tions in the civil law, criminal law and procedural law areas remains the same. The number of 
commercial law citations is also slightly decreased, given that some countries have specialized 
high courts in the area of employment law. 
5.2. Empirical data per citing court 
Table 10, below, shows the number of citations in the five main fields of law organized by the 
citing country, both in absolute numbers and percentage-wise. In addition, as the Austrian data 
account for almost half of our cross-citations, we can provide further details: thus, Figure 3, be-
low, presents the cross-citations of the Austrian court for each subfield of law with more than five 
citations.  
 
Table 10: Fields of law by country of citing court 
 Administra-
tive law 
Core civil 
law 
Criminal 
law 
Procedural 
law 
Commercial 
law 
Total 
8 142 5 67 254 476 Austria 
1.68% 29.83% 1.05% 14.08% 53.36% 100% 
0 25 5 11 9 50 Belgium 
0.00% 50.00% 10.00% 22.00% 18.00% 100% 
0 2 0 19 16 37 England 
0.00% 5.41% 0.00% 51.35% 43.24% 100% 
0 1 0 5 1 7 France 
0.00% 14.29% 0.00% 71.43% 14.29% 100% 
0 5 0 6 30 41 Germany 
0.00% 12.20% 0.00% 14.63% 73.17% 100% 
0 95 0 96 42 233 Ireland 
0.00% 40.77% 0.00% 41.20% 18.03% 100% 
0 4 0 2 1 7 Italy 
0.00% 57.14% 0.00% 28.57% 14.29% 100% 
4 19 19 19 29 90 Nether-
lands 4.44% 21.11% 21.11% 21.11% 32.22% 100% 
0 0 15 1 0 16 Spain 
0.00% 0.00% 93.75% 6.25% 0.00% 100% 
0 18 11 18 12 59 Switzer-
land 0.00% 30.51% 18.64% 30.51% 20.34% 100% 
Total 12 311 55 244 394 1016 
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Figure 3: Cross-citations of the Austrian Supreme Court by subfields of law 
 
In Austria, more than half of the cross-citations are in commercial law, which is not surprising, 
given that the cited country in the vast majority of Austrian cross-citations cases is Germany. 
Historically, all the fields summarized under the “commercial law” heading have been very simi-
lar in those two countries, in particular since 1938, when the German Commercial Code and sev-
eral other business law statutes were introduced in Austria.106 Interestingly, the largest number of 
commercial cases in which the Austrian cites the German supreme court concern insurance law, 
i.e. the Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (Insurance Contract Act). The German Act was introduced 
in Austria in 1939, and a recodification that closely follows German law was enacted in 1958.107 
Even more than in other commercial law fields, the text was for a long time almost identical to 
the German one.108 Only reforms in the 1990s and 2000s, particularly a large reform in Germany 
in 2008, led to substantive divergence. 
The second largest group of commercial law cases concerns the law of unfair competition 
(Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb), where there are more significant differences between 
the statutes, but which is in the end largely case-based. The Austrian courts have generally adopt-
ed German models under what circumstances business policies are considered to violate public 
policy (gute Sitten).109 IP law, which is in large parts harmonized through EU directives, follows 
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in the 3rd position. Generally commercial law, which includes, for example, compensation claims 
by commercial agents, bills of exchange, commercial contracts, and commercial firm names, also 
provides a relatively large number of cross-citations, followed by corporate, insolvency, interna-
tional trade, partnership, and antitrust law. 
Interestingly, the Austrian Supreme Court has also cited its German counterpart 138 times 
in general civil law cases (including consumer protection and landlord-tenant law), and three 
times in family and inheritance law cases. This is may be more than one might expect, given that 
the differences in civil law are far greater than in commercial law.110 It may in part reflect the 
larger number of civil law cases and also illustrate how legal ideas can diffuse between jurisdic-
tions with similar language. The Austrian Civil Code is much older than the German one (the 
codes were enacted in 1812 and 1900 respectively), but its interpretation has been influenced by 
German law since the German Civil Code (BGB) came into existence. The same phenomenon 
may explain the cross-citations in procedural law: while 23 concern conflict of laws and jurisdic-
tional issues, 21 relate to civil procedure in a more narrow sense, and two to criminal procedure. 
Overall, the influence of German law on Austrian law is hard to overestimate: Georg Kodek, a 
sitting justice of the Austrian Supreme Court, recently even suggested that recourse to German 
law has become so common that is almost necessary to explain when it is not appropriate (usually 
because of differences in the law).111 
In Ireland, the country with the second largest number of cross-citations (where the cited 
court is the UK in the vast number of cases), the pattern is relatively similar. Our data (based on 
an estimate)112 indicate 76 cases where the UK court is cited relating to general civil law (such as 
tort law or land law) and 19 relating to family and inheritance law. The focus of civil procedure 
citations is different than in the relationship between Austria and Germany. We have no citations 
on conflict of laws, but 19 on arbitration. There are 57 citations on general civil, 38 on commer-
cial law and 19 citations on criminal procedure. All of these are areas where the law of Ireland is 
fairly similar to England and other common law countries. 
The Netherlands, Switzerland and, to a lesser extent, Belgium are often characterized as 
legal traditions that have been influenced by both the German and the French civil law tradi-
tion.113 This is also apparent in the cross-citations in different areas of law. In the Netherlands, 
the picture is fairly complex, as a variety of countries are cited.114 The most cited country, Ger-
many, is referred to 10 times for civil law, 15 times for criminal law, and 7 times for criminal 
procedure, and 6 times for IP; most other citations address various commercial law issues. French 
civil law, by contrast, is cited only 4 times. The Dutch Supreme Court seems particularly eager to 
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look abroad in cases of criminal procedure (citing Germany 7 times, Belgium 5 times, Austria 
and Switzerland twice each, and Belgium, France, and Italy once each), and in IP (citing Ger-
many 6 times, England 4 times, France twice and Belgium once). The Swiss pattern is similar, 
with Germany being cited 11 times for civil law and 10 times for criminal law, 8 times for crimi-
nal procedure. Interestingly, France is the only country cited for corporate law (3 times), while 
the same country is cited twice for civil law and civil procedure each. In Belgium, citations to 
French jurisprudence dominate, with 18 civil-law citations, 3 family and inheritance citations, 
which seems to show the lasting influence of the French civil law tradition in Belgium. Besides a 
few others, there are also 6 citations to the French courts on issues of civil procedure. Interest-
ingly, Germany is also cited 3 times on civil law issues and once on a family/inheritance issue. 
The German citation pattern seems to reaffirm the idea of legal families, since the target 
of the vast majority of the citations is Austria (the only country cited more than twice). Here we 
have 12 IP cases, 5 insurance law cases, and 5 cases on the law of unfair competition. As indi-
cated earlier, the statutory and theoretical basis for which is very similar in both countries; more-
over there are 4 citations on matters of international trade. But even in areas where the law is 
more different, namely civil law (3), family and inheritance law (1) and civil procedure (4), there 
are some citations of the Austrian Supreme Court. 
England, another country that is rather an exporter than an important of legal ideas, has a 
more balanced citation portfolio. The most interesting observation is that the court tends to look 
abroad most frequently in the field of conflict of laws, where France is cited 6 times, Germany 
and the Netherlands 4 times each, and Spain twice. There are also 5 IP citations to Germany, 3 to 
France, as well as one for Austria and the Netherlands each. This may reflect how IP law is heav-
ily influenced by the EU. 
In Spain, which is almost exclusively an “importer” country, all citations are in the field 
of criminal law, except for one relating to criminal procedure (citing Germany). Germany is cited 
13 times for criminal law, France and Belgium once each. Apparently, this reflects that Spanish 
criminal law has been influenced by German law, whereas in other fields there are more pro-
nounced similarities to the French legal tradition.115 
In the two countries with the smallest number of cross-citations, France and Italy, the pat-
terns are probably as far away from a representative sample as possible. A notable aspect is that 
in France (where almost all citations were made by the reporting judge)116 most seem to be on 
civil procedure, specifically regarding the question whether France has jurisdiction over foreign 
nationals (citing Belgium, Italy and Switzerland once). In one case, the reporting judge discusses 
the German Supreme Court’s propensity to judicial law-making. Besides that, there is only one 
case on IP, and a civil law case in which the court cites the European Court of Human Rights’ 
reference to the Belgian court’s jurisprudence. 
Relating these findings to the normative debate, it can be seen that courts tend to refer to 
foreign judgments in areas of law where this is seen as helpful for this particular court. Thus, we 
do not observe “cherry-picking” for results but courts consider which other country’s law is rela-
tively similar in a particular area of law – possibly leading to the emergence of a “common core” 
for groups of countries in these areas of law. It can also be suggested that a targeted use of for-
eign case law in particular areas helps to improve the quality of court decisions as such foreign 
law is compatible but also potentially more advanced than the domestic law in this specific area. 
                                                 
115
 See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 87, at 104-109. 
116
 See supra 3.2. 
28 
 
5.3. Empirical data per cited court 
It is also interesting to identify which courts are most frequently cited in particular areas of law. 
If one took just the absolute figures, however, such data would not be very revealing as they 
would be almost entirely dominated by the citations from Austria to Germany and Ireland to Eng-
land. Thus, for the purposes of Table 11, we calculated how often the other courts would have 
been cited, if each court had the same number of cross-citations, and then presented these prefer-
ences in terms of percentages of all citations in the four main areas of law.117 
 
Table 11: Most popular cited courts per areas of law (normalized) 
 
Core civil law Criminal law Procedural law Commercial law 
Austria 6.76% 0.00% 4.54% 28.86% 
Belgium 8.37% 5.20% 13.97% 1.13% 
England 11.13% 0.00% 10.45% 5.53% 
France 25.34% 10.08% 15.34% 12.28% 
Germany 42.69% 82.87% 33.90% 42.68% 
Ireland 1.75% 0.00% 2.14% 1.39% 
Italy 0.00% 0.00% 6.65% 1.10% 
Netherlands 1.71% 1.24% 4.31% 4.00% 
Spain 0.00% 0.00% 0.71% 0.70% 
Switzerland 2.26% 0.61% 7.98% 2.32% 
Total 100 % 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 11 shows that Germany is the most popular cited court in all four areas of law, in particular 
with an astonishing proportion of more than 80% in criminal law. French and England are the 
next most-popular cited courts, in particular in core civil law and procedural law. In addition, 
Belgium performs well in procedural law and Austria in commercial law. 
 These results confirm the regular nature of cross-citations. As eight of our ten countries 
are civil law countries, it was to be expected that German and French courts are the most popular 
courts to be cited. They also confirm that German law has been influential in some countries tra-
ditionally associated with the “French legal origin”, such as Italy and Spain, in particular in crim-
inal law. With respect to the popularity of England, it is plausible that private and procedural law 
have a greater appeal to other countries than criminal law as the latter is very different from the 
laws of continental European countries. The relatively frequent citations of the Austrian court in 
commercial law seem to reflect that here Austrian law is more similar to the laws of other coun-
tries than in many other areas of law (including core civil law, as explained). And the relative 
popularity of the Belgium court in procedural law reflects similarities to the French and Dutch 
law in this area. 
 
5.4. Empirical data per reasons to cite 
Table 12, below, turns to the relationship between the areas of law and the reasons to cite foreign 
courts, using the complete dataset.118 It can be seen that in “case history or jurisdiction” criminal 
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and procedural law perform above average, in “international or European law” this is the case for 
constitutional law, and for “pure comparative” it is core civil law.  
 
Table 12: Areas of law and reasons to cite 
 
case history or 
jurisdiction 
international or 
European law 
pure 
 comparative  
Total 
 
4 82 7 93 Constitutional 
law 4.30% 88.17% 7.53% 100% 
6 43 158 207 Administrative 
law 2.90% 20.77% 76.33% 100% 
16 27 284 327 Core civil law 
4.89% 8.26% 86.85% 100% 
19 14 41 74 Criminal law 
25.68% 18.92% 55.41% 100% 
34 55 189 278 Procedural 
law 12.23% 19.78% 67.99% 100% 
14 78 359 451 Commercial 
law 3.10% 17.29% 79.60% 100% 
93 299 1038 1430 Total cited 
6.50% 20.91% 72.59% 100% 
 
Again we suggest that this confirms the fairly regular and non-arbitrary nature of cross-citations. 
It is plausible that “pure comparative” arguments are most pronounced in core civil law since 
here relatively general legal questions tend to be posed (e.g., when is a contract concluded? what 
constitutes a tort?) that make it potentially rewarding to look for inspiration from other legal sys-
tems. One possible explanation is that civil codes tend be relatively generally formulated. A field 
of law that is not very “dense” in terms of the number and specificity of legal rules will likely 
invite more frequent recourse to more general legal principle, which creates space which can be 
more easily filled with cross-citation.119 With respect to “international or European law”, we ob-
serve, for example, the impact of international and European human rights law on matters of con-
stitutional law, whereas core civil law is only affected in relatively few cases. In the category 
“case history and jurisdiction” it is notable that procedural law includes questions of conflict of 
laws (see Table 8, above), and that in some criminal law decisions it may be necessary to con-
sider the sentences already imposed by foreign courts. 
Another question interesting to explore would be whether cross-citations are, overall, dis-
proportionately more frequent in particular areas of law. For example, one may expect that in 
relatively international fields, such as commercial law, courts feel more inclined to refer to court 
decisions from abroad than in those of family law. Unfortunately, in order to provide a compre-
hensive answer to this question, it would be necessary to have data on all domestic citations of 
the ten supreme courts in all areas of law. Still, some indications can be provided. For example, 
we can establish that only about 1% of our cross-citations (12 out of 1016 decision) concern fam-
ily law – while it seems not unlikely that more than 1% of all supreme court cases concern mat-
ters of family law. Potentially, this may reflect cultural differences that exist even between Euro-
pean countries in this field. However, we do not claim that the supreme courts of our study do not 
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also use foreign precedents for topics where moral questions are at stake.120 For example, re-
searchers have found that in Europe a number of courts have considered foreign precedents in 
cases of “wrongful birth” and “wrongful life”, based on non-quantitative methods.121 While the 
focus of this article is on our quantitative dataset, we agree that it can be rewarding to examine 
individual cases of cross-citations in more detail. Thus, the subsequent section explains represen-
tative examples of foreign citations in a qualitative way, in particular with the aim to develop a 
taxonomy of types of cross-citations. 
6. Taxonomy of types of cross-citations 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In our quantitative analysis, we excluded citations merely resulting from the history of the case 
and, then, only distinguished between citations due to international/European law and purely 
comparative citations.122 It is the aim of this section to provide a more nuanced qualitative picture 
of different types of cross-citations. It is structured according to the role a foreign citation plays 
to the court decision in question: it may the case that the court refers to the result of a foreign 
decision (see 6.2); that it seeks inspiration from a foreign court’s judicial reasoning – which may, 
or may not, be relevant to the result (see 6.3); or that the citation is mainly “ornamental” – that is, 
irrelevant for the result (see 6.4). In addition, it will be indicated how detailed the respective 
analysis is, since in any of the aforementioned categories the court may either argue in a compact 
or in an elaborate way.123 
A variety of reasons may explain why a court prefers one or the other type of cross-
citations. The comparative law literature often discusses general differences in judicial style, in-
cluding the style of citations.124 In particular, it may be expected that common law courts provide 
a more careful analysis of the facts in each cited case, given the doctrine of stare decisis. It has 
also been suggested that comparative law needs to consider “judicial audiences and reputation”, 
for example, as it may matter that civil law countries have a “career” and common law countries 
a “recognition” judiciary.125 Such a perspective is also related to recent research on “legal real-
ism” and the judiciary, for example, as scholars try to understand how incentives and extra-legal 
decisions determine judicial style, including the use of precedent.126 
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This section does not aim to explore all details that may influence the judicial style of the 
ten courts discussed in this article. Yet, it will show that some conventional views about judicial 
style do not always hold for cross-citations. Moreover, in line with the overall aim of this article, 
it will discuss what these types tell us about the desirability of cross-citations. 
6.2. Result-oriented citations 
The American public would probably think of citations of foreign law in the context of the US 
Supreme Court primarily as providing relatively general claims about what courts have decided 
in some other jurisdictions that are important enough for American judges to take notice. In cases 
of this type, courts look primarily at the result (e.g. whether executing minors is unconstitutional 
or not),127 but not at the legal analysis in detail. 
In the courts of our study, result-oriented citations seem to occur frequently in cases high-
ly-politicized where the result is very important for ideological reasons. In cases of this type, the 
actual legal reasons are likely to be less interesting than the outcome of the case. A number of 
examples can be found in cases relating to the issue of “wrongful life.” These cases concern the 
question whether parents of a disabled child or even the child should be granted damages against 
a doctor who was at fault at failing to detect disabilities prenatal screening of the fetus.128 Closely 
related “wrongful conception” cases relate to the question of whether doctors are liable for child 
support payments following an unsuccessful vasectomy or sterilization. For example, the Italian 
Court of Cassation states that: 
“the French Court of Cassation (plenary assembly), in the famous Perruche deci-
sion of November 28, 2001, turning away from previous jurisprudence, declared, 
however, that ‘when the errors committed by a physician and the laboratory in ex-
ecuting the contract concluded with a pregnant women prevent the latter from ex-
ercising her own choice in terminating the pregnancy, in the end resulting in the 
birth of a handicapped child, the latter can demand compensation of damages con-
sisting of the disability itself, caused by the aforementioned errors.’”129 
The court goes on to point out that the French legislator subsequently intervened to elimi-
nate the possibility of damages in the absence of medical error that aggravated the child’s condi-
tion.130 The court subsequently refers to the French case and subsequent legislation several times, 
but only to the outcome, not to the reasons for it. The detailed discussed of the Italian court turns 
primarily on the question whether there is a right “not to be born” under Italian law. 
Our study also includes several decisions by the Austrian Supreme Court on the issue. The 
first one (actually the second in Austria addressing the issue)131 briefly cites the German Supreme 
Court in the last paragraph and states that it also recognizes damages for the parents, without 
looking deeply at the reasons for the decision. In a subsequent case,132 the court tackles the re-
lated issue of an unsuccessful vasectomy, following which the patient sued the doctor for ali-
mony, the court briefly describes the laws of Germany, England, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Spain, France, Italy, Scotland, Denmark, and the US. For all countries, the reference has the 
character of a list, i.e. the court seems to be interested only in whether such claims are admitted 
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by the courts. Interestingly, and maybe tellingly, while the overview on the courts is limited to a 
single paragraph, the court subsequently discusses the views expressed in 13 law review articles, 
dedicating one paragraph to each; before moving to its own analysis, the court summarizes the 
German academic literature in another paragraph. The third case on the issue133 does not provide 
such a detailed analysis, but refers to its prior jurisprudence, stating that it does not have to go 
into further detail regarding foreign case law again. Nevertheless, the court cites recent case law 
from Germany and Switzerland and concludes that the courts in both countries recognize dam-
ages. 
We also found corresponding result-oriented cross-references in “wrongful life” cases in 
Switzerland, Ireland and the Netherlands. The Swiss decision refers, relatively briefly, to the re-
sults reached by the German, Dutch, British, and Austrian Courts,134 and the Irish decision does 
the same for the British, French and German courts.135 The Dutch cross-citation136 is in the opin-
ion of the advocate general. It provides a more extensive discussion of the case law of various 
countries, in particular France, Germany and the UK, yet, overall it is clear that it is mainly the 
results that are seen as decisive. 
Another example of politicized cases are those of assisted suicide. Here too, we have a 
relatively extensive comparison in an opinion of the Dutch advocate general.137 There is also an 
Italian case on this issue:138 the court had to deal with a controversy relating to life-extending 
measures taken for a comatose patient and provides detailed citations to various courts, including 
some courts from the US (New Jersey), the UK House of Lords, and the German Supreme Court. 
While the court provides a detailed description of the principles the various courts apply to the 
decision-making process (e.g. that the decision should be taken as to conform to the hypothetical 
wishes of the patient), it does not analyze how the courts derived these principles. 
Perhaps surprisingly,139 we also find result-oriented cross-citations in more pedestrian 
cases, though here the references to foreign courts may be (even) more condensed. For example, 
in an Austrian case140 the supreme court had to deal with the issue of whether creditors who had 
lent to a company after it became insolvent can recover their losses from directors who failed to 
file for bankruptcy upon insolvency and thus take the firm out of business. Diverging from its 
own previous decisions, but trailing newer German case law, the court recognized that “new” 
creditors are entitled to this kind of claim. Again, the Austrian court recites the results of the 
German court in a few paragraphs without directly engaging with its legal reasoning.141  
Similarly, two Spanish decisions discuss limitations on the exercise of universal jurisdic-
tion on criminal law matters imposed by international law.142 In one case, the court first describes 
limitations at great length and subsequently mentions that “both limitations have been expressly 
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accepted by the German courts” (after which the court cites three decisions of the German Su-
preme Court in brackets). The citation to the German jurisprudence apparently serves as a persua-
sive argument why the Spanish court’s view must be correct. In the other case, the court cites the 
German court in a similar fashion, and subsequently describes a view of the Belgian court for a 
limitation of the genocide convention. As a final example, in France, one of the few cases where 
we identified cross-citations falls into this category. In its opinion143 the reporting judge describes 
the development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and lists the Belgian, Italian and Swiss 
courts as having abandoned the idea of its absoluteness in a single sentence. 
From a normative perspective, is a results-oriented approach problematic? This would be 
the case if the foreign precedent were treated as a binding authority and its application seen as an 
evasion of domestic law. By contrast, if one takes a legal realist perspective and decides that only 
the outcome is important, then it does not really matter how the court arrives at its result. Regard-
ing the outcome only, there are at least two possibilities. One the one hand, engagement with for-
eign cases could provide with useful information about empirical effects of particular policy deci-
sions, which improve the quality of decision-making in terms of the outcome. On the other hand, 
looking only at the outcome may help the court to cherry-pick preferred foreign results.  
One might argue that how a court arrives at its results matters. In part, the reason is that 
judicial decisions derive some of their legitimacy from their acceptance in the legal community 
(and beyond). However, the extent of a legal opinions decision depends very much on the norms 
prevailing in that community.144 Very likely the differences we have observed depend on differ-
ences in the degree to which cross-citations are accepted in the respective legal system.  
Our examples do not suggest that a pure results orientation is all that problematic. As we 
have seen, almost all of them involve purely referential citations. Thus, we do not find that courts 
try to evade domestic law and to impose foreign moral standards on the local population. Rather, 
the actual legal arguments seem to focus on the respective national law. It is, however, also pos-
sible that foreign law sometimes exerts influence without explicit attribution; a court may merely 
cite the result and then incorporate the legal argument into its subsequent domestic analysis with-
out disclosing its origin. 
6.3. Citations based on judicial reasoning 
Cross-citations related to international or European law145 are based on the rationale that the judi-
cial reasoning of a foreign court can help for the legal interpretation of the provision in question. 
Many examples could be provided. For instance, an Irish case146 dealt with the interpretation of 
the term “knowledge” under Article 25 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Carriage by Air (“Warsaw Convention”). The court explains in brief 
sentences that the UK, Swiss and Belgian courts constructed this as a “subjective test”, whereas 
the French courts adopted an “objective one”; the Irish court then decides to apply a mixed test. 
Examples of cross-citations dealing with the provision of a related convention, the Con-
vention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (“CMR”), can be found 
in a decision of the German court147 and an opinion of the Belgian advocate general.148 Another 
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German example is on the interpretation of a provision in the EU Regulation on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (“Brussels I”),149 
and an example from the UK deals with the EU law on trade marks.150 In all of these instances, 
the references to foreign case law are fairly short. By contrast, opinions of the Dutch advocate 
general on issues of intellectual property law engage in a more extensive comparison of various 
judgments of German, French, Belgian and UK courts in order to interpret the underlying provi-
sions of European and international law.151  
Turning to pure comparative cases, there are also a number of instances where courts do 
not primarily look at the outcome of foreign cases, but the arguments used by the courts to 
achieve this result. Which form of reasoning the court adopts depends to a large extent on the 
argumentative style of the citing court. A judicial style that allows reference to policy should in 
theory be relatively open to consider policy arguments used by peer courts. 
In the decisions of the High Court of Ireland we find frequent examples of such cross-
citations, namely as far as they cite English courts. Sometimes these citations are written in a 
style that seems to indicate that it is beyond doubt that these precedents apply in Ireland.152 Other 
decisions are more reflective. For example, in one of them it is said that “(w)hile decisions in 
another Jurisdiction are in no way binding on me as is the practice in all Jurisdictions regard is 
had to decisions in other Jurisdictions and if they are found to be persuasive they are fol-
lowed.”153 But, then, it may also happen that, while the legal argument of the English courts is 
followed, the Irish court distinguishes the actual facts of the cases and therefore reaches a differ-
ent result.154 
This form of judicial reasoning can be seen as typical for the common law. Comparative 
lawyers observe that common law countries often still perceive that their legal systems share the 
“common law as a whole”.155 A recent survey of common law judges has also found that guid-
ance in judicial interpretation is seen as the most plausible reason to refer to foreign court deci-
sions.156 With respect to the cross-citations identified in this article, reference can be made to a 
decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales that includes a very detailed section dis-
cussing recent developments in other common law jurisdictions.157 
With respect to civil law countries, the asymmetric Austrian-German relationship pro-
vides a number of examples. In one Austrian case158 the analysis is largely based on German ju-
risprudence. The dispute is about a severance payment for a commercial representative, an area 
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where both laws are similar, but which also leave open ambiguities and questions that can be 
filled with case law. Almost all of the opinion of the Austrian court discusses German case law 
and literature; only in the last longer paragraph, the court looks at a specific section in the Aus-
trian law that could be used as the basis for an analogy that would reach the same result. 
There are, however, also cases displaying this kind of pattern even in areas of law where 
the law is less similar. A decision from 2005159 concerns basic civil procedure and therefore does 
not have a specific reason for a comparative analysis, since both procedural codes have distinct 
histories. The Austrian court cites a decision of the German Imperial Court160 for the proposition 
that even in a joint lawsuit (einheitliche Streitgenossenschaft), individual participants may lose 
their right to appeal separately. The court further cites a decision of the German Supreme Court 
and six commentaries on the German procedural code to back up the claim. In a 2003 decision161 
on whether fees for telephone sex can be recovered by the phone company against the owner of 
the phone connection, the Austrian court analyzes the development of the German case law, dis-
agreements between different panels of the German Supreme Court as to whether the enforceabil-
ity of such claims would be against public policy, and various German articles at great length. 
Only in the second half of the opinion it moves on to Austrian literature, the basis for related con-
tracts under Austrian law, and ultimately finds that such contracts can be enforced (the issue 
seems to be whether telephone fees have to be paid). The Austrian Supreme Court does not even 
always distinguish German cases from Austrian ones (even though the origin of the case will typ-
ically be apparent to experts from the citation style).162 
While overall, there are a large number of Austrian cases citing German ones, there are al-
so some tools that enable the Austrian courts to “rationalize” these citations. Sometimes Austrian 
courts reuse arguments, which may include cross-citations. For example, in our search we found 
a series of cases relating to firms that were fined for not disclosing their financial statements at 
the court of registry, all of which argued that one of the deciding judges of the court of appeals 
was biased because he had written articles on the issue. Since the issue is essentially the same (in 
some cases the lawyers were the same as well), entire decisions are reused with minimal, if any 
modifications.163 All of these decisions include the same citation to the German Supreme Court in 
the court’s analysis, as well as a blanket reference to the jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Court 
in the part describing the appellant’s submission. In addition, the Austrian Supreme Court uses a 
further, idiosyncratic citation method that also falls under the present category. Generally, it has 
to tendency to “self-plagiarize”, in other words repeatedly use boilerplate texts taken from previ-
ous opinions for the same proposition. Some of these boilerplates are separately published as 
Rechtssätze (official maxims) in the database of the case law.164 By searching for a Rechtssatz 
number, one can locate all cases that used it. Frequently, entire paragraphs are copied into new 
opinions. These copies also include the references, including citations of foreign courts made in 
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that paragraph. For example, the cases on the recusal of judges just mentioned include a Rechts-
satz with a cross-citation to the German Supreme Court.165 
The Swiss Supreme Court cites the German one not as frequently as the Austrian court 
does. Yet, as far as there are cross-citations, it can also be seen that these often concern brief con-
firmations of the legal reasoning of the German court. In three decisions, covered in this study, 
the Swiss court makes a statement about a particular point of legal reasoning and then simply 
adds a reference to the German court.166 Somehow more cautious are two other cases, since those 
use the word “compare” (vergleiche) for the reference to the German court: yet, here, the German 
judgment is the only reference provided167 – so the result is the same, namely that the legal rea-
soning of the German court is apparently regarded as persuasive. 
Opinions of the Belgian and Dutch advocate generals168 tend to be quite thorough with 
many citations to prior case law, scholarship, and occasionally foreign courts. Often, these cita-
tions fall in the “reasoning” category. For example, in a Belgian decision on tort law169 the advo-
cate general discusses the views of the French, Dutch and German courts going into detail par-
ticularly with respect to French law. Specific citations to individual decisions are given in foot-
notes (in total, the opinion has 46 footnotes, in which various courts and scholars are cited). In 
other cases the analysis of French law by the advocate general seems to go into the greatest level 
of detail.170 The style of the Dutch advocate general is similar. In some examples only the case 
law of one foreign country is analyzed; however, this is then based on a careful and detailed as-
sessment of the foreign court’s reasoning. For instance, two criminal law cases (on criminal ca-
pacity and HIV infection) analyzed the reasoning of the German case law in detail, also citing 
some of the text of the German decisions in the original language.171 
 The remaining three civil law countries have fewer cross-citations and only some of them 
may be of interest for the current category. In a rare Italian case172 the court cites a specific deci-
sion of the German Supreme Court for the proposition that a debtor can also effect payment to the 
creditor by bank transfer (even if not specifically stipulated). Even though the analysis is limited 
to a rather short paragraph, the court cites the applicable section of the German Civil Code and 
briefly describes how the German court derived the result from it. In France, an example may be 
an opinion of the reporting judge173 that addresses the issue of judicial lawmaking and, based on 
secondary literature, describes the attitude towards it under the common law, EU law, as well as 
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German law, for which he cites the jurisprudence of the not only the Federal Supreme Court, but 
also the Constitutional Court. With respect to the former, he spends two paragraphs describing 
the court’s attitude (in two specific cases) toward judicial lawmaking and the effects of changes 
in jurisprudence on legal certainty. Finally, the Spanish Supreme Court is interesting here since – 
somehow akin to the Austrian court – there are examples where it economizes opinion-writing. In 
one decision the court mentions that the European Court of Human Rights favorably cites the 
jurisprudence of the German Supreme Court,174 but then we found several further cases that use 
exactly the same paragraph175, and some others that use similar text with the same citations.176 
What lessons can be drawn from all of this for the desirability of cross-citations? A skep-
tic may interpret some of the Irish and Austrian cross-citations as too unreflective (or even as 
defying national sovereignty) since they often seem to simply accept the legal reasoning of the 
English and German courts. It could also be criticized that none of the courts has developed clear 
criteria for the use of foreign case law: rather, these seem to be made in an ad-hoc fashion.  
However, we would provide a more positive interpretation. The reason smaller jurisdic-
tions refer relatively frequently to larger ones simply derives from the fact that the courts of the 
latter countries tend to have more opportunities to deal with certain legal problems; thus, the for-
mer courts can fill a temporary gap in the current law. In particular, it is plausible that in these 
situations courts may look for inspiration from relatively similar foreign countries, since here 
even some of the formal tools of legal reasoning may be transplantable. 
We have also seen that courts and advocate generals sometimes engage in a wider com-
parative analysis referring to the case law of various other countries. We also regard this as 
broadly positive. It may show that, in Europe at least, there are sufficient commonalities of legal 
reasoning that enable judges to understand each other. In particular, this is necessary due to the 
growing volume of rules that derive from European and international law. To be sure, such com-
parisons are not always easy. Yet, therefore, it is also plausible that courts have not developed a 
blueprint for comparative reasoning but approach cross-citations based on judicial reasoning in a 
piecemeal manner. 
6.4. Ornamental cross-citations 
The previous section explained that the Irish court often cites the English one, and the Austrian 
often cites the German one, using the foreign case law to support the respective court’s legal rea-
soning. However, as far as England and Germany “return the favor”, these citations tend to be of 
a more rhetorical (or ornamental) nature. For example, in an English case the court provides a 
statement and then just adds the words “see the later decision” with a reference to the Irish 
court.177 Thus, the Irish decision is apparently just used to confirm a view already taken.178  
 More examples can be provided from the German Supreme Court, citing the Austrian 
court, as well as other foreign supreme courts. For example in one of the decisions the court 
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makes the statement that a particular interpretation of trade mark law is widely accepted by lower 
courts (Instanzgerichte) and then provides the following list of references: 
“vgl. OLG München WRP 2000, 775, 778; GRUR-RR 2005, 220; OLG Hamburg 
GRUR-RR 2005, 118, 119 [nicht rechtskräftig]; OLG Karlsruhe WRP 2004, 507, 
508; LG Hamburg MMR 2000, 46; CR 2002, 136; CR 2002, 374; LG Frankfurt 
a.M. MMR 2000, 493, 494 f.; LG München I NJW-RR 2001, 550; MMR 2004, 
689, 690; LG Köln CR 2006, 64; LG Braunschweig MMR 2006, 178; vgl. auch 
ÖOGH GRUR Int. 2001, 796, 797 - Numtec-Interstahl; LG Mannheim MMR 
1998, 217, 218; a.A. OLG Düsseldorf GRUR-RR 2004, 353)”.179 
It can be seen that the court refers to ten German lower courts (the OLG and LG) and, close to the 
end of the citation, adds the words “vgl. auch ÖOGH” meaning “compare also the Austrian Su-
preme Court”. Thus, there seems to be a certain obsession of the German Supreme Court with 
references, and it is unlikely that the Austrian decision has been a decisive factor for the German 
court. Corresponding examples can be provided for cross-citations to the highest Swiss and 
Dutch courts.180 
In some decisions of the Swiss and Austrian Supreme Courts we can also see these orna-
mental cross-citations, since, here too, courts embellish their opinions with extensive references – 
also including references to the academic literature.181 For example, a Swiss decision, dealing 
with a question of criminal sentencing, first, refers to another decision of the Swiss Supreme 
Court, then to two books on Swiss criminal law and subsequently adds a “see also” reference to 
the German Supreme Court.182 Similarly, a decision of the Austrian Supreme Court already men-
tioned in the preceding section183 deals with the question of whether a judge needs to recuse him-
self after having publicly expressed a legal opinion that might be relevant to the case. In transla-
tion, the court says: 
“The fact that a judge advanced a legal view (even if it is rejected in the jurispru-
dence of the Supreme Court) by itself just as little creates the appearance of bias as 
the publication of particular legal view in a scientific treatise (Fasching Zivilpro-
zessrecht² Rz 164; 4 Ob 36/89 = RZ 1989/110 page 282; RIS-Justiz RS0045916; 
BGH, NJW 2002, 2396; Münchener Kommentar zur ZPO² § 42 Rz 21).”  
The citation in brackets is interesting as it illustrates several different types of citation: The Aus-
trian legal literature is cited once (Fasching), as is the German literature (Münchener Kommen-
tar). With “4 Ob 36/89 = RZ 1989/110 page 282”, the court cites one of its prior decision. “RIS-
Justiz RS0045916” is the citation to the “Rechtssatz” described in the previous section. The cita-
tion to the German Supreme Court (BGH) seems to be purely ornamental and not to add any val-
ue.184 
 There are also examples of such cross-citations in the opinions of the Dutch advocate 
general. While he or she often discusses some foreign case law in great detail (see the previous 
section), there are some instances where cross-citations are of a more academic nature. In particu-
lar, this can be seen in examples where, in a footnote, the main reference is to a Dutch decision or 
                                                 
179
 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], May 18, 2006, I ZR 183/03 (Germany). 
180
 BGH, November 15, 2006, XII ZR 120/04 (Germany); BGH, November 08, 2005, KZR 37/03 (Germany). 
181
 For a similar point see Marc Forster, Functions and Practice of Legal Citing: Towards a Uniform International 
Quotation System, 23 INT’L J. L. INF. 149, 153-157 (1995) (identifying different groups of high courts based on the 
custom to cite, or not to cite, academic writings). 
182
 Bundesgericht [BGer], October 26, 2005, 6S.163/2005 /gnd (Switz.). 
183
 OGH 19.5.2005, 6 Ob 92/05f (Austria). 
184
 Regarding “RIS-Justiz” see supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text. 
39 
 
a reference in the Dutch literature, and only subsequently the words “for a similar point” (with 
reference to a foreign decision) have been added.185 
 In the assessment of this type of cross-citations, it may initially be puzzling why courts 
provide these “see also” references without further discussing the content and how exactly it re-
lates to the problem at hand. Citations of this type are, in the academic legal literature, used to 
provide the reader with a source for broader information about the topic discussed by the author. 
A legal author would thus facilitate further research by the reader, which helps him to better un-
derstand the field of law discussed. Opinions written by courts obviously do not have this func-
tion. The purpose, from the perspective of the judge or clerk drafting the opinion would then 
seem to be to strengthen the authority of the court in the legal community by showing how well 
researched the opinion is, and thus immunize the court against criticism, even if the result is fair-
ly obvious.186  
 A potential problem may be that these very brief cross-references are, by their very na-
ture, not able to engage in a “proper” comparison of the domestic and foreign law that would take 
into account possible differences in the legal and non-legal context between the countries. How-
ever, as far as courts (or advocate generals) have considered these foreign decisions, it seems 
useful that they make this transparent in the decision. At a very modest level, these ornamental 
cross-citations can also be seen as beneficial as they may stimulate comparative legal discussions, 
be it at the level of courts, advocate generals or in the legal literature. 
7. Conclusion 
This article has analyzed cross-citations between ten European supreme courts in order to assess 
the normative case for or against this practice. To set the scene, in Figure 1,187 we developed a 
conceptual scheme of the main arguments supporting or rejecting the use of citations of foreign 
courts. Based on the findings of the previous sections, Figure 4 returns to this scheme in order to 
re-assess this question.  
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Figure 4: Re-visiting the patterns of argument of foreign citations 
 A. Character of law B. Quality of decision C. Procedural reasons 
 
1. Pro 
 
common core 
(+) as far as relevance of 
international / EU law and 
legal families  
 
 
 
useful information 
(+/-) often superficial 
citations but smaller ju-
risdictions benefit from 
larger ones  
 
 
 
transparency 
(+) non-transparent style 
of some courts harmful 
for fruitful dialogue 
 
 
2. Contra national  
character 
(+/-) no uniqueness but 
other legal systems may 
be more or less remote 
 
 
“cherry picking” and 
misapplications 
(-) data do not show ran-
dom “cherry picking” or 
desire to evade domestic 
laws 
 
costs and 
lack of benefits 
(+/-) problems of accessi-
bility of foreign case law; 
but also positive exam-
ples 
 
3. Reply foreign case law not 
authoritative 
(+) yes, persuasive or 
even rhetorical 
develop criteria for using 
foreign case law 
(-) none of the courts has 
developed such criteria 
make foreign case law 
more easily accessible 
(+/-) some efforts to im-
prove availability of for-
eign case law 
 
Starting with the line of reasoning related to the “character of law” (column A.), there is some 
support for the argument that cross-citations are justified by a “common core” shared by at least 
some legal systems. We found that a good number of cross-citations are the result of international 
and European laws,188 and that the categories of legal families (or legal origins) can explain some 
of the variation of cross-citations.189 However, the relevance of legal families can also speak 
against cross-citations as it may show that foreign courts only regard such other courts as worth 
citing with whom they are aligned with intellectually, culturally and ideologically anyway. But 
this point should not be overemphasized. Our regression analysis indicates that legal families are 
not the most important explanatory factor,190 and the analysis of cross-citations for different areas 
of law has also shown that other factors play a crucial role.191 Moreover, according to our qualita-
tive assessment of representative cases, the courts in our study use foreign case law mainly as 
persuasive argument – or even just as a purely ornamental one:192 thus, we did not find that citing 
a foreign court would undermine national sovereignty and democracy.  
With respect to the line of reasoning related to the “quality of decision” (column B.), the 
facts that smaller jurisdictions tend to cite larger ones, and that less-corrupt countries receive 
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more citations193 speak in favor of the argument that citing courts benefit from the experience and 
soundness of foreign case law. Of course, one should also not be too idealistic about this argu-
ment since we have also seen that the use of foreign citations is often fairly superficial, in particu-
lar, as far as courts just seem to be interested in the results of foreign cases.194 But we also do not 
find evidence for the counter-argument that courts just “cherry pick” any decision they find con-
venient and try to evade provisions of domestic law. Throughout this article we have seen that 
cross-citations are not made randomly but that many factors rationally explain why cross-
citations are more or less frequent in particular situations.195 This also implies that it may be ac-
ceptable that none of our courts has developed precise criteria for the use of foreign case law.196  
With respect to procedural reasons (column C), we have seen that there is considerable 
diversity in the way courts cite, or do not cite, courts from other countries.197 We would suggest 
that courts should make it transparent if they have relied on foreign legal ideas since this can con-
tribute to a potentially fruitful dialogue between courts from various countries as they often have 
to deal with similar problems.198 Of course, given the efforts to research foreign case law, it is not 
a surprise that only a small proportion of all cases cite foreign courts.199 Yet, these problems 
should also not be exaggerated since in matters of policy importance courts and, even more so, 
advocate generals have shown to able to go into the details of case law from various other coun-
tries.200 It also helps that most of our courts make their decisions freely available on the web.201  
It can be concluded that, by and large, our analysis supports the use of cross-citations. 
This raises the question how it may be possible to enhance the frequency of cross-citations if one 
believes that to be beneficial. One response could be that we need to change “how judges 
think”.202 In particular, it would then be necessary to explore how at the level of individual judges 
citations reflect the personality of the judge and the network of social relations in which he or she 
is embedded.203 Such a “micro-approach” could also be an interesting extension for the data pre-
sented in the current article, though it would face the problem that in civil law countries courts 
typically do not write individual judgments but decide in panels. 
Another response is to focus on the costs of making use of foreign case law. Here, our da-
ta provide some further insights. Most cross-citations are made by courts for which the cost is 
small. In countries such as Ireland and Austria, English and German law are readily accessible in 
the respective libraries and in the form of legal databases. Not unsurprisingly, the quantitative 
part of our study also found that common languages matter.204 Moreover, as some of our cases 
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indicate, foreign case law is often discovered and explored through the comparative law litera-
ture, which reduces the cost.205  
In the years following the period we studied, the cost has further decreased with the estab-
lishment of a transnational database of decisions of by the Network of the Presidents of the Su-
preme Judicial Courts of the European Union.206  In addition, global portals provide links to the 
court decision of many countries of the world.207 But there are limitations too. According to 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, a global community of judges must also “share the common values and 
principles that constitute the normative understandings of a community”.208 Our study also point-
ed to more pedestrian reasons such as differences in citation style and language barriers. Thus, 
while a fully global transnational dialogue between courts seems difficult to achieve, we would 
hope that our study may provide a model for a study that could be replicated in other parts of the 
world. 
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